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Minority Rights, Multiculturalism and EU Enlargement: the Case of 
Estonia 
DAVID J SMITH  
Department of Central and East European Studies, University of Glasgow, UK 
 
This article examines the process of EU enlargement and its impact upon ethnopolitics in 
contemporary Estonia. After discussing the construction of the post-communist state 
order within the context of emerging CSCE and CoE norms on minority rights, the 
author looks at how Estonia was able to reconcile its so-called ‘ethnic democracy’ with 
the EU Copenhagen criteria requiring the ‘respect for and protection of minorities’. The 
author draws attention to the subsequent shift away from ‘nationalizing statehood’ in 
Estonia towards a new strategy of ‘multicultural integration’ (where ‘multicultural 
democracy’ is portrayed as the ideal end-point of the integrative processes currently 
underway). In conclusion, the author  discusses some of the ambiguities surrounding the 
concept of ‘multicultural integration’. Whilst deemed consistent with EU norms, it is 
argued that the meaning of this term remains vague and contested within an Estonian 
context. As a consequence, its relationship to existing Western models – and its 
applicability to post-Soviet Estonia – is still not entirely clear.  
 
I. Introduction 
 
The nationality question in contemporary Estonia has formed the object of 
considerable attention – both academic and political – over the past decade.1 In the 
course of 1940 to 1991, Soviet policies of industrialization led to large-scale 
settlement by Russians and representatives of other Soviet nationalities. 
Consequently, the share of ‘non-titular’ nationalities in Estonia’s population grew 
from its pre-war figure of 12 per cent to 39 per cent by 1989. When Estonia restored 
its independence in 1991, Soviet-era settlers and their descendants (around 30 per cent 
of the total population) were denied any automatic right to Estonian citizenship. The 
citizenship law of February 1992 granted this right only to citizens of the inter-war 
Estonian Republic and their descendants. Other residents wishing to obtain citizenship 
have had to undergo naturalization, a process which requires applicants to fulfil a 
three (subsequently five) year residence qualification, swear an oath of loyalty to the 
state and demonstrate a working knowledge of the Estonian language. As a result of 
Soviet nationalities policy, only 13 per cent of the Russian-speaking minority 
professed itself fluent in Estonian at the time of independence. In the period since 
1989, the state has adopted a number of measures intended to re-establish the primacy 
                                                 
1 A recent study has identified over two hundred books and articles devoted to this topic. See R. 
Ruutsoo, “Discursive Conflict and Estonian Post-Communist Nation-Building”, in M. Lauristin and M. 
Heidmets (eds.) The Challenge of the Russian Minority. Emerging Multicultural Democracy in Estonia  
(Tartu: Tartu University Press, 2002): 35. 
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of the Estonian language in all spheres of society following the de facto ‘asymmetrical 
bilingualism’ of the Soviet era. Using the terminology developed by Rogers Brubaker, 
a number of commentators have identified these measures as ‘nationalizing policies’ – 
i.e. policies designed to restore the primacy of a titular nation defined in ethno-
cultural terms and distinguished from the citizenry as a whole. According to 
Brubaker, ‘nationalizing statehood’ has been the dominant mode of nation-building in 
all of the states that have emerged or re-emerged from the collapse of Yugoslavia and 
the USSR.2 In Estonia and Latvia in particular the nation-state and democracy were 
presented as ‘conflicting logics’ in the aftermath of independence.3 This remained the 
case to a large extent in 2001, insofar as 20 per cent of the population still lacked 
Estonian citizenship at this time.4 
In the same period, Estonia has been notable for its dedicated pursuit of integration 
with European and Euro-Atlantic international organizations. Progress has been swift. 
A member of the Conference (later Organization) for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) since October 1991, Estonia joined the Council of Europe (CoE) in 
May 1993, and in 1998 became the first of the three Baltic States to be admitted to 
negotiations on European Union (EU) membership. It is now scheduled to join the EU 
in May 2004 following the recent Copenhagen European Council. This pursuit of 
integration, however, has necessarily entailed the acceptance of external constraints 
over the state-building process. In what follows, I examine the nexus linking EU 
conditionality to domestic debates on national minorities. First, I consider how 
Estonia has been able to reconcile its controversial nationalities policy with the EU 
‘Copenhagen criteria’ relating to guarantees of democracy and respect for and 
protection of minorities. Most authors would assert that the quest for EU membership 
and – most notably – the receipt of a positive avis from the European Commission in 
1997 have brought about a fundamental change in approach. In this regard, the 
hitherto prevalent ‘nationalizing’ (and exclusionary) ideology has given way to a new 
                                                 
2 R. Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 4-5; for a 
depiction of Estonia in these terms, see especially the more recent works by Graham Smith e.g. The 
Post-Soviet States (London: Arnold, 1999): 80-83. 
3 On ‘conflicting logics’, see: J. Linz and A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post -communist Europe (Baltimore and London: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996): 401-433. 
4 European Commission, Progress Report Estonia (Brussels: European Commission, 2002): 30. The 
report notes that 117,000 non-Estonians have been granted Estonian citizenship since the citizenship 
law came into force in 1992, with the rate of naturalization appearing to have stabiliszed at a low level 
of around 2 per cetn (3000 to 4000 persons) of resident non-citizens per year. 
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discourse of ‘emerging multicultural democracy’, which is in turn deemed consistent 
with EU norms.5 Having examined this shift, I conclude by discussing the extent to 
which current prescriptions for minority rights in Estonia can be deemed appropriate 
to the situation which currently obtains there.  
 
II. The European Context 
 
The current process of EU enlargement has taken shape within the context of what has 
been termed the western ‘project’ towards the post-socialist East.6 This project is 
founded on the contention that the only viable course open to the former communist 
countries is to adopt the political values and economic system of the West. Or, as 
Graham Smith perhaps more accurately terms it, on the maxim that “what is good for 
Europe and the West is good for the world”.7 The proven track record of the EU in 
terms of inculcating stability and greater prosperity in post-war Western Europe has 
meant that it has exerted considerable ‘pull’ towards the peoples of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE). Whilst the ‘New’ Europe is ostensibly an ‘economic, political 
and philosophical programme’ rather than a geographical concept, the eastward 
projection of EU influence has in practice involved the drawing of new boundaries 
between, on the one hand, CEE ‘insiders’ and, on the other, the ‘outsiders’ of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This division has in turn done much to 
condition the nature and degree of international influence upon the former communist 
states.8 In this regard, the three Baltic States have of course been classed as Central 
European states rather than ‘Former Soviet Republics’ following the restoration of 
their independence, and have thereby been included amongst the ranks of the 
prospective EU member states. Whilst all are in practical terms former Soviet 
republics, the forcible nature of their incorporation into the USSR during 1940 meant 
                                                 
5 Lauristin and Heidmets (eds.), The Challenge of the Russian Minority; see also V. Pettai, “Estonia 
and Latvia: International Influences on Citizenship and Minority Integration”, in J. Zielonka and A. 
Pravda (eds.) Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe. Vol. 2 International and Transnational 
Factors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001): 257-280. 
6 K. E. Smith, “Western Actors and the Promotion of Democracy”, in Zielonka and Pravda (eds.) 
Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: 31-57. On EU enlargement as an ‘order-building 
project’, see also P. Aalto, “Post-soviet Geopolitics in the North of Europe”, in M. Lehti and D. J. 
Smith (eds.), Post-Cold War Identity Politics. Northern and Baltic Experiences  (London: Frank Cass, 
2003) 
7 G. Smith, “Transnational Politics and the Politics of the Russian Diaspora”, Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, 22 (3). May 1999: 515; see also G. Smith, The Post-Soviet States: 2 for a discussion of the 
nature of Western influence. 
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that they had never been legally recognized as such by the democratic states of the 
West. Having condemned the events of 1939-40 as an illegal annexation, Western 
European governments never gave de jure recognition to Soviet rule over the three 
Baltic states. Rather, they continued to regard them as independent countries under 
occupation by the USSR. Indeed, back in 1979, the European Parliament voiced 
support for demands – voiced by dissident and émigré circles – that the Baltic case be 
examined within the committee for decolonization of the United Nations.9 In 
accordance with this doctrine of legal continuity, the parliament of the Estonian 
Republic simply called upon longer-established states to restore diplomatic ties when 
it declared immediate separation from the USSR in August 1991. International 
recognition was duly obtained upon this basis. 
The political and economic conditionality laid down within the Copenhagen 
criteria and the terms of the acquis communautaire has provided the EU with a 
powerful instrument for shaping the process of transition in the prospective member 
states of CEE. However, the degree of engagement has shown considerable variation 
according to country and issue area. In the latter regard, the political facets of 
‘Europeanization’ have been far less clearly defined than the economic.10 This is 
perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the sphere of minority rights. Here, the EU 
has relied on mechanisms developed under the auspices of the OSCE and the CoE. In 
1995, the latter adopted the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (FCNM) – perhaps the most relevant standard pertaining to minority rights 
in Europe.11 The consistency of monitoring within this framework, however, has been 
undermined by the absence of any single agreed definition of the term ‘minority’, 
which, within the intergovernmental framework of the OSCE and CoE, remains 
subject to definition by individual states. In practical terms, moreover, both 
organizations have exhibited double standards as regards their approach to minority 
issues in the west and east of Europe. 
                                                                                                                                            
8 Lehti and Smith (eds.), Post-Cold War Identity Politics 
9 J. Prikulis, “The European Policies of the Baltic Countries”, in P. Joenniemi and J. Prikulis (eds.), The 
Foreign Policies of the Baltic Countries: Basic Issues (Riga: Centre of Baltic-Nordic History and 
Political Studies, 1994): 92. 
10 See, for instance, J. Batt, “Introduction: Region, State and Identity in Central and Eastern Europe” in 
J. Batt and K. Wolczuk (eds.), Region, State and Identity in Central and Eastern Europe  (London: 
Frank Cass and Co., 2002): 1-14. 
11 Maria Fernanda Perez-Solla, “What’s Wrong with Minority Rights in Europe”, EUMAP, 6 
November 2002. http://www.eumap.org/articles/content/91/916/index_html 
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The current European minority rights regime has institutionalized a state of 
inequality between existing Euro-Atlantic states and the post-communist states of 
CEE, a state of affairs which recalls the League of Nations’ approach to the minority 
question after World War One.12 Initial proposals for minority protection, discussed 
under the auspices of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the OSCE sought 
to establish a system which would be both universalist and far-reaching in scope. This 
approach argued for the promotion of positive rights rather than merely the prevention 
of discrimination. It also provided for the dispatch of missions of experts to 
designated states at the behest of other OSCE members and – under certain 
circumstances – without the consent of the state concerned. A similar challenge to 
state sovereignty was implicit in the creation, at the July 1992 Helsinki Summit, of an 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), who can become 
involved in the affairs of a particular state at his own discretion and without the 
permission of the government concerned.13 Pretensions to universalism were, 
however, undermined by the reluctance of Western OSCE states to consent to any 
dilution of their own sovereignty.14 In the course of 1990-92, states such as France, 
Greece and the United States declared that there were no representatives of ‘national 
minorities’ amongst their populations, despite the existence of groups that could 
legitimately carry this label. Britain and Turkey, supported by Spain, subsequently 
insisted that the HCNM could not intervene where terrorism was involved, thus taking 
the Irish, Kurdish and Basque questions off the international agenda.15  
As part of their determination to avoid any far-reaching minority rights obligations, 
Western actors also managed to establish a clear conceptual distinction between, on 
the one hand, historically rooted ‘indigenous’ minority groups residing within their 
borders and on the other, communities of recent immigrants such as Turks, Kurds, 
North Africans and Asians. These latter groups have been designated under the label 
of ‘ethnic’/‘new’/’immigrant’ rather than ‘national’ minority – which is to say that 
they are not deemed to have any “valid claim to language rights and self-government 
                                                 
12 A. Burgess, “Critical Reflections on the Return of National Minority Rights Regulation to East/West 
European Affairs” in K. Cordell (ed.), Ethnicity and Democratisation in the New Europe  (London: 
Routledge, 1999): 52; D. Chandler, “The OSCE and the Internationalisation of National Minority 
Rights” in K. Cordell (ed), Ethnicity and Democratisation, p.64. 
13 Chandler, op cit: 64 
14 Ibid: 61-76 
15 Ibid: 64 
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powers necessary to maintain [themselves] as a distinct societal culture.”16 As Will 
Kymlicka has observed, this distinction is valid insofar as most groups of recent 
immigrants to Western societies have not regarded it as desirable or feasible to pursue 
their own nation-building project. Typically, small and dispersed, they have 
traditionally “accepted the expectation that they will integrate into the larger societal 
culture. Few have objected to the requirement that they should learn the official 
language as a requirement for citizenship or that their children should learn it at 
school”.17 Kymlicka also reminds us that Western states have adopted a variety of 
practices towards their immigrant populations. In this regard, it is necessary to 
distinguish between ‘immigrant minorities’ – immigrants who have the right to 
become citizens – and ‘metics’ – immigrants, such as Turkish Gastarbeiter in 
Germany, who are not given the opportunity to become citizens. In a number of cases, 
such groups have settled more or less permanently in considerable numbers, yet 
remain excluded from the polis.18 Kymlicka also discerns a significant change in 
policy towards settled ‘immigrant minorities’ in a number of Western states over the 
past 30 to 40 years. Whereas previously, the expectation – generally accepted – was 
that immigrants should assimilate themselves completely into the dominant societal 
culture, in recent times, immigrant minorities have sought to ‘renegotiate’ the terms of 
integration by calling for a more tolerant and multicultural approach. Many states, in 
turn, have seen advantages in abandoning assimilation in favour of a model of 
‘immigrant multiculturalism’. Whilst this does not extend as far as measures designed 
to promote a separate societal culture, it nevertheless encourages immigrant groups to 
maintain their customs, and may incorporate some measure of language rights. A key 
tenet of this approach is that integration is a two-way process involving society as a 
whole. Just as immigrants are expected to adapt themselves to the dominant societal 
                                                 
16 W. Kymlicka, “Estonia’s Integration Policies in a Comparative Perspective”, contribution to A. 
Laius, I. Proos and I. Pettai (eds.), Estonia’s Integration Landscape: From Apathy to Harmony  
(Tallinn: Avatud Eesti Fond and Jaan Tõnissoni Instituut, 2000). Accessed via web at 
http://www.jti.ee/et/hr/integratsioon/kymlicka_eng.html: 6; Chandler, op cit: 61-76. On the distinction 
between ‘national’ and ‘ethnic’ minority see also: W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995): 10-14.  
17 Kymlicka, “Estonia’s Integration Policies”, op cit: 7; in a similar vein, Rogers Brubaker, op cit: 60; 
describes the term ‘national minority’ as “a dynamic political stance, or, more precisely, a family of 
related yet mutually competing political stances, not a static ethno-demographic condition”. 
18 Ibid: 7-13 
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culture, so the larger society must adapt its own attitudes, institutions and practices in 
order to accommodate the identities of its immigrant citizens.19  
States which adopt the latter approach can be termed ‘polyethnic’ rather than 
‘multinational’.20 It was precisely the latter designation which many western OSCE 
member states were anxious to avoid at the start of the 1990s. Consequently, although 
OSCE norms have retained the principle that national minority issues are an 
international – rather than a purely domestic – concern, the discussions held by the 
organization in Helsinki during 1992 ‘made the OSCE claims to universal 
commitment ring hollow’. In practice, it became clear that the regulative power of the 
OSCE would be directed towards Eastern, rather than Western Europe. By 1992, the 
initial optimism underpinning the Western ‘project’ had been dispelled by the 
emergence of violent ethno-national conflicts within the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia and the USSR. These never turned into the epidemic that many 
anticipated, and have proved to be the exception rather than the rule where political 
transformation of multiethnic societies is concerned. Nonetheless, they did much to 
reinforce long-standing stereotypes of the East as a backward locus of tribal hatreds. 
in need of education from the West. 21 It is this perception that does much to explain 
the preoccupation with minority rights in post-communist Europe. As David Chandler 
notes, this area has been treated primarily as a security, rather a humanitarian or 
cultural issue.22 By extension, the premium has been placed on stability, consolidation 
of state sovereignty and preservation of existing borders rather than the promotion of 
minority rights per se. One reason why existing OSCE member states were so 
reluctant to sanction a far-reaching policy based on positive rights was the fear that 
this might have a destabilizing effect on their own societies as well as those of the 
post-communist East. Thus far, for instance, the policies of European international 
organizations have eschewed the multinational paradigm of statehood in favour of a 
                                                 
19 Ibid: 7-10 
20 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, op cit: 10. 
21 Chandler, loc cit; Burgess, op cit: 54; A. Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania and the Path to Independence  (London: Yale University Press, 1993): 381. For further 
discussion of these attitudes, see H. Miall, O. Ramsbotham and T. Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict 
Resolution (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999): 90; D. Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian-
Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad , (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998): 19; J. 
Batt, “Dilemmas of Self-Determination in Central and Eastern Europe: Historical Perspectives on the 
Nation-State and Federalism”, draft chapter for forthcoming work ‘Fuzzy Statehood’ and European 
Integration in Central and Eastern Europe as part of the ESRC “One Europe or Several?” Programme 
(University of Birmingham, 2000): 2. 
22 Chandler, loc cit 
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more limited conception of minority rights. As Graham Smith noted in 1999, the 
rights of minorities are “to be protected through the promotion of individual (as 
opposed to collective or group) rights. … There has been no call by the OSCE for the 
protection of multicultural rights based upon affirmative action policies, 
consociational political structures, recognition of local diasporic group rights or dual 
language policy”.23  
Similarly, with regard to EU enlargement, Karen Smith argues that signals put out 
by the West are confused. Issues of democratization and minority rights have not 
always been the priority as far as making decisions on enlargement is concerned – 
indeed, they have generally been secondary to stability, progress in economic reform 
and the degree of external support that a particular state can command.24 In this 
respect, Estonia’s progress towards the EU has rested upon its impressive track record 
in the field of economic transformation, which in turn has been an important factor in 
the preservation ethnopolitical stability. Although the ability to initiate radical 
economic ‘shock therapy’ during the early 1990s rested partly upon the political 
marginalization of the Russian-speaking settler population – widely, although perhaps 
mistakenly, tipped to be the biggest losers from the collapse of the soviet economy – 
it has been possible to discern an overarching consensus within society as far as the 
direction of economic development is concerned.25 In terms of international support, 
Graham Smith observes that “the position of the Baltic States has been bolstered 
thanks not only to their Scandinavian ‘friends at court’, but also to their privileged 
place in the West’s geopolitical imagination as culturally and politically nearer to 
Western Europe than the other post-Soviet states”.26  
 
III. The Domestic Context 
 
Above all, perhaps, the degree of receptivity to international influence is contingent 
upon the domestic political context and the nature of the pathway from authoritarian 
                                                 
23 G. Smith, “Transnational Politics”, op cit: 515-516. This is in spite of an ‘unusual’ resolution of the 
OSCE Copenhagen Summit which stated that the use of appropriate local administrations 
corresponding to specific territorial circumstances is a legitimate means of protecting or promoting 
minority identity. 
24 K. E. Smith, loc cit; A. Pravda, “Introduction”, in Zielonka and Pravda (eds.) Democratic 
Consolidation in Eastern Europe: 13-15  
25 See D. J. Smith, Estonia. Independence and European Integration  (London: Routledge, 2001): 113-
146. 
26 G. Smith, “Transnational Politics”: 514 
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rule.27 Similarly, in order to understand fully the relations between a state and its 
minorities it is necessary to pay attention to the historical context governing the 
particular case.28 This said, it is still possible to draw general conclusions regarding 
the social and political conditions underlying the national question, and to draw them 
together into a general explanatory framework. In his own analytical framework, 
Rogers Brubaker asserts the primacy of ‘nationalizing statehood’: a civic or binational 
definition of the state, he claims, is unlikely to prevail, so pervasively institutionalized 
are understandings of the nation as ethnocultural rather than political.29 This assertion 
would seem unduly categorical. A better starting point would be “to acknowledge the 
possibility that differing and overlapping forms of identities are in the making, which 
refuse to follow the totalizing contours of … essentialist theorizing”.30 As Judy Batt 
and Kataryna Wolczuk have suggested, post-communist debates on state and nation-
building in Central and Eastern Europe have been permeated by the two themes of 
‘national self assertion’ on the one hand and ‘Europeanization’ on the other. These, 
they see as analogous to the two themes of ‘essentialism’ and ‘epochalism’ which 
Clifford Geertz has used to frame the politics of national identity in post-colonial 
states.31 An analysis of post-communist CEE suggests that ruling elites have been 
required to strike a balance between the two, both discursively and in terms of 
constitutional practice.32  
In the case of Estonia, the experience of independent statehood between the wars – 
coupled with the special status accorded to the Estonian Republic within the USSR –
meant that the concept of a ‘Return to Europe’ figured prominently in the discourse of 
the national movement from its very beginnings in the late 1980s. This was one 
element (albeit the most essential) of a broader discourse of Westernisation connoting 
claims to membership of what could be termed the ‘Euro-Atlantic Space’. There thus 
appeared to be a clear prospect that the West would be able to exert significant 
                                                 
27 Pravda, op cit: 15; Pettai, op cit: 257  
28 Brubaker, op cit: 103 
29 Ibid: 105 
30 G. Smith, The Post-Soviet States: 3 
31 J. Batt, “Introduction”, loc cit; C. Geertz The Interpretation of Cultures (1973): 240-241 
32 On the place of Europe within nation-building debates in CEE/CIS states, see for instance: K 
Wolczuk, “History, Europe and the ‘national idea’: the ‘official’ narrative of national identity in 
Ukraine”, Nationalities Papers, 28 (4) 2000; I. Pavlovaite, “Paradise Regained. The Conceptualisation 
of Europe in the Lithuanian Debate”, in Lehti and Smith (eds.), Post-Cold War Identity Politics; see 
also O. Wæver, “Explaining Europe by Decoding Discourses” in A. Wivel (ed.), Explaining European 
Integration (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press, 1998). 
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influence over Estonia and its neighbours.33 Indeed, even Rogers Brubaker was forced 
to admit that in the case of the Baltic states, “external incentives … may favor 
transethnic state- and nation-building strategies, oriented to the citizenry as a whole 
rather than to one ethnonationally qualified segment of that citizenry”.34 At the same 
time, as Brubaker observes, ‘nationalizing’ programmes and policies enjoyed a strong 
appeal in Estonia and Latvia in the immediate aftermath of independence. In this 
regard, one could argue that the circumstances under which independence was 
recognized served to strengthen trends towards ethnonationalism. Although the status 
of the ‘Russian-speaking population’ had already begun to elicit international 
attention in the course of Estonia’s campaign for independence, this issue did not 
prove to be an obstacle to gaining recognition in 1991. Recognition according to the 
doctrine of legal continuity, moreover, reinforced exclusionary discourses towards 
Soviet-era settlers. Post-communist debates on state and nation-building in Estonia 
have been heavily marked by the experience of Soviet nationalities policy over the 
preceding half century. As Brubaker demonstrates, the Soviet system institutionalized 
both the territorial/political and ethnocultural/personal modes of nationhood and 
nationality as well as the tensions between them.35 Mass settlement by Russians and 
representatives of other ‘non-Estonian’ nationalities in Estonia during 1944 to 1989 
became the focus of growing resentment amongst representatives of the ‘titular’ 
nation. Since Russian-speaking settlers and their descendants born in Estonia were 
under little or no compulsion to learn Estonian, the shifting ethno-demographic profile 
of the republic’s population was deemed by many to raise the prospect of ultimate 
russification. From the early 1970s onwards, dissident tracts became increasingly 
ethno-nationalist in tone. Russian-speaking settlers were variously depicted as 
“colonists”, “civil occupants”, a “civil garrison of the empire” and “an ominous 
tumour in the body of the Estonian … nation”.36 
Concern at growing immigration was a factor which fuelled nationalism amongst 
all sections of ‘titular’ society. In 1988-89 the movement for independence was 
initially spearheaded by the more moderate Popular Front of Estonia (PFE), headed by 
                                                 
33 L. Meri, 'ôiguste ja kohutuste tasakaal', speech on the occasion of Estonia’s acceptance as a member 
of the Council of Europe, 13 May 1993, in Lennart Meri, Presidendikõned: 335; Pettai, op cit: 266 
34 Brubaker, op cit: 47  
35 Brubaker, op cit: 23-54; see also Laitin, Identity in Formation: 66-74.  
36 From the Baltic dissident journal Lituanus (vol. 22, no. 1, 1976): 65-71. Quoted in T. Parming, 
“Population Processes and the Nationality Issue in the Soviet Baltic”, Soviet Studies, 32 (3). July 1980: 
403. 
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nationalists drawn from the ranks of the soviet ‘establishment’. Unlike the more 
radical dissidents, the PFE leadership viewed the size of the non-Estonian minority as 
a factor dictating caution. First in opposition and, from 1990 to 1992 in government, 
the PFE under its leader Edgar Savisaar pursued a moderate and pragmatic strategy 
predicated on mobilizing all residents of the Estonian SSR – regardless of ethno-
cultural nationality – behind the campaign for independence. Pressure from the PFE 
was instrumental in the adoption of a new language law in January 1989. This 
established Estonian as the sole official language of the ESSR. However, it also 
incorporated extensive guarantees for the continued use of Russian in public life, and 
its implementation was preceded by widespread consultations with Russian-speaking 
work collectives. The caution exercised by the PFE and its nationally-minded fellow 
travellers within the Communist Party of Estonia reflected the emergence of 
opposition to the independence drive not only in Moscow but also locally in the form 
of the Internationalist Movement of the Working People of the ESSR and the United 
Council of Work Collectives. Having failed to mobilize the non-Estonian population 
through recourse to Marxist-Leninist ideology, these upholders of Soviet power 
sought to play the national card by warning of the dangers which independence would 
pose to the interests of what was termed the republic’s ‘Russian-speaking population’. 
As such, they denounced the language law as discriminatory and demanded the 
establishment of a new consociational-style system of government which would 
effectively have allowed Russian political representatives to veto any move towards 
independence.37 The predominantly Russian-speaking cities of Narva and Sillamäe in 
north-east Estonia constituted a particular locus of opposition at this time. Here local 
authorities refused to implement legislation passed by the Supreme Council and later 
put forward demands for territorial autonomy within the Estonian republic.38  
Most accounts of the period suggest that pro-Soviet elements never commanded 
the loyalties of more than a third of non-titulars. Contrary to the impression put out by 
the all-union Soviet media, Estonia’s putative ‘Russian-speaking population’ was in 
fact deeply heterogeneous in terms of ethnic origin, political outlook and degree of 
integration into Estonian society. From 1988, the Estonian national movement sought 
                                                 
37 D. J. Smith, “Legal Continuity and Post-Soviet Reality: Ethnic Relations in Estonia 1991-95” 
unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Bradford, 1997: 69. 
38 For a more detailed discussion of developments in Narva, see D. J. Smith, “Narva Region within the 
Estonian Republic. From Autonomism to Accommodation?”, in Batt and Wolczuk (eds.), Region, State 
and Identity in Central and Eastern Europe . 
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to accentuate this diversity by promoting the development of distinct identities on the 
part of Ukrainians, Belorussians, Jews and other smaller nationalities.39 Even so, from 
the point of view of the PFE it was important to avoid any undue provocation which 
might be seized upon by the ‘Intrid’ and their allies in Moscow. Throughout 1988 to 
1991, Savisaar and his supporters therefore argued for a ‘zero option’ approach 
whereby citizenship of a future independent Estonia would be made available to all 
residents of the existing ESSR.40 In the course of 1991, the PFE-led government also 
expressed a readiness to grant a form of territorial autonomy to north-east Estonia 
along the lines proposed by local leaders there. Whilst Savisaar’s prescriptions for the 
state order in a future independent Estonia were seemingly rather vague, it seems 
certain that had citizenship been granted to all residents – and the PF government 
remained in power, some form of multi-nation state, structured along territorial 
federal/consociational/bilingual lines would probably have ensued. 
In the course of 1989 to 1991, however, the pragmatic stance of the PF leadership 
was supplanted by a growing emphasis on legal restorationism. Since 1987, radical 
nationalist groups drawn from former dissident circles had been demanding an 
immediate and unconditional end to Soviet occupation and the legal restoration of 
Estonian independence. These radical groups, not least the unofficial ‘Citizens’ 
Committee’ movement founded in 1989, came to command considerable moral 
authority amongst the titular population. The growing popularity of legal 
restorationism lay partly in the fact that it offered the most persuasive argument for 
independence in the face of the evident truculence of the Soviet central leadership. By 
the same token, it provided a rationale for denying political influence to the putative 
‘fifth column’ of Soviet-era settlers. From the start of 1989, radical nationalist groups 
insisted that so-called ‘colonists’ had no right to a say in determining Estonia’s future. 
Their political vision was predicated on the goal of restoring the Estonian nation-state 
which had existed between the two World Wars. In this regard, they understood only 
                                                 
39 D. J. Smith, “Legal Continuity”, op cit.: 174. This is a strategy which has met with a fair degree of 
success. By 1993, the Union of National Minorities established by the Popular Front already 
incorporated 30 cultural societies representing 21 different minorities. 
40 Again, just prior to the August 1991 coup and declaration of independence, the Popular Front came 
out in favour of an ‘option’ variant whereby all citizens of the ESSR would be given a choice between 
taking Estonian or Soviet citizenship. Those opting for Estonian citizenship were to be granted it 
unconditionally. I. Rotov, “Kodakonsusest: Optsioon voi Naturalisasioon?”, Rahva Hääl, 8 September 
1991. In the wake of independence, the PFE proposed an ostensibly stricter draft based on 
naturalization, yet this contained a series of waivers which would have allowed virtually all settlers to 
obtain citizenship automatically. 
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too well that if Soviet-era settlers and their descendants obtained automatic citizenship 
and political rights, they would be well placed to press for a multinational ‘third 
Estonian Republic’ conceived as a successor state to the USSR.41  
The ‘philosophy of restorationism’ espoused by the radicals gained even greater 
currency once international recognition was accorded on the basis of legal continuity 
of the first republic. For many members of the PFE, it seems, the commitment to zero 
option citizenship during 1988 to 1991 had owed less to conviction than it had to fear 
of a Russian backlash and/or ostracism by the West. When neither of these fears 
materialized, a number of prominent moderates simply defected to the restorationist 
camp in the months after August 1991. What emerged amongst Estonian political 
actors in the course of this nationalist ‘bidding war’ was a new consensus based on the 
need to secure the political hegemony of the titular nation within the restored state. 
This ensured the destruction of an inclusive draft law on citizenship tabled in 
November 1991 and heralded a shift towards the more restrictive legislation adopted 
in February 1992. Once the bottom line of excluding settlers from immediate political 
influence had been achieved, however, there was no consensus on a long-term policy 
towards the nationality issue. For the most radical wing of the national movement 
(what might be termed the ‘decolonization’ caucus), The naturalization of all, or even 
a considerable part of the settler population was deemed unacceptable, since it would 
inevitably prevent the restoration of an Estonian nation state. As such, settlers should 
be encouraged to leave Estonia and ‘repatriate’ themselves to their putative ‘ethnic 
homeland’ of Russia. The citizenship law of 1992 was conceived as the first step 
towards that end.42 Other, more moderate /pragmatic voices, however, insisted that it 
was unrealistic to expect settlers to leave Estonia in large numbers, and that it was 
therefore necessary to find a way of accommodating them within the framework of 
the restored republic. This was all the more so given that the West was not about to 
acquiesce in radical – and potentially highly destabilizing – demands for a formal 
programme of decolonization, Cold War era adherence to legal continuity 
                                                 
41 M. Laar, U. Ots  and  S. Endre, Teine Eesti (Tallinn, 1996): 175. 
42 Basing their argument upon Article 49 of the Geneva Convention, the most radical advocates of 
decolonization saw no reason why the civil representatives of Soviet colonial rule should expect 
treatment any more lenient than that which had been meted out at the end of the Second World War to 
German civilians who had settled in territories annexed by the Third Reich. CSCE Mission to Estonia, 
“Attitudes of the Political Forces in Estonia towards the Question of the Russophone Population (an 
outline)”, 23 September 1994; V. Saarikoski, “Russian Minorities in the Baltic States”, in P. Joenniemi 
and P. Vares (eds.), New Actors on the International Arena: The Foreign Policies of the Baltic 
Countries, Tampere Peace Research Institute Research Report, No.50, (Tampere, 1993), o p cit: 135 
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notwithstanding. As one of the key architects of the post-independence state order has 
argued, if Estonia was to secure its ‘return to Europe’, it was necessary to find a ‘third 
way’ which would guarantee the legal continuity of statehood yet allow for a radical 
renewal of the constitutional order according to the principles of the late twentieth 
century.43 
If one looks at the constitutional order established during 1991-92, it can indeed be 
regarded as a hard-fought political compromise which guaranteed the supremacy of 
the titular nation yet also incorporated a number of mechanisms for ensuring ethno-
political stability and conformed – in strictly legal terms, at least – to European 
standards concerning the treatment of minorities. As Graham Smith noted back in 
1994, the system that emerged bore all the hallmarks of a hegemonic control regime.44 
More specifically, Smith described it as an ‘ethnic democracy’ – a system which “in 
combining some elements of civil and political democracy with explicit ethnic 
dominance, … attempts to preserve ethno-political stability based on the 
contradictions and tensions inherent in such a system.”45 There are three main facets 
to an ethnic democracy: first, it ensures that the titular nation possesses a superior 
institutional status beyond its numerical proportion within the state; secondly, it 
makes certain civil and political rights available to all; and finally, it accords certain 
collective rights to ethnic/national minorities.46  
The system established in 1992 did bear a striking resemblance to this model. The 
status of Estonian as the sole official language of national and local government, first 
established under the 1989 language law, was enshrined in the constitution of 1992. 
The citizenship law of the same year established knowledge of Estonian as a criterion 
for naturalization as a citizen, whilst the parallel residency requirement ensured that 
settlers and their descendants would be unable to obtain citizenship in time to vote in 
the first post-independence elections of September 1992. With an electorate that was 
                                                 
43 M. Lauristin, “Kommentarid”, in Kaks Otsustavat Päeva Toompeal (19-20 August 1991) (Tallinn, 
1996): 81 
44 ‘Hegemonic control’ has been defined as a system of “coercive and/or co-optive rule which 
successfully manages to make unworkable an ethnic challenge to the state order” J. McGarry and B. 
O’Leary, “Introduction: The Macro-Political Regulation of Ethnic Conflict”, in McGarry, J. and 
O’Leary, B. (eds.), The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation  (London, 1993): 23 
45 G. Smith, A. Aasland and R. Mole, “Ethnic Relations and Citizenship”', in Graham Smith (ed.), The 
Baltic States: The National Self Determination of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania  (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1994): 189-90; for a more recent account of Estonia as a control regime, see V. Pettai and 
K. Hallik, “Understanding processes of ethnic control: segmentation, dependency and co-optation in 
post-communist Estonia”, Nations and Nationalism, 8 (4). 2002: 505-529. 
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now 90 per cent ethnically Estonian – as opposed to 65 per cent two years earlier – it 
was hardly surprising that the new 101 member parliament (Riigikogu) consisted 
entirely of Estonian representatives. By far the largest number of seats (29) fell to the 
radical nationalist Isamaa (Fatherland) bloc. In October 1992 this formed a 
government with the National Independence Party (ESRP – by far the most 
restorationist in outlook of the main political parties) and the Moderate bloc drawn 
from former members of the Popular Front 
Provision for minority rights under the 1992 constitution is centred on the 
paradigm of non-territorial cultural autonomy, which was pioneered with some 
success in the inter-war Estonian Republic. Article 50 of the 1992 constitution thus 
states that “national minorities have the right, in the interests of national culture, to 
establish self-governing agencies under conditions and pursuant to procedure 
provided by the national minority cultural autonomy act”. Restored to existence in 
1993, this law allows representatives of national minority groups numbering more 
than 3,000 the right to form themselves into public corporations and establish cultural 
autonomy. Provided the initiators of the corporation can register at least half of the 
adult members of the relevant group onto a national register (nimekirja), they can hold 
elections to a Cultural Council. If elected, this Council can – with a two thirds 
majority vote – proceed to implement an autonomy scheme giving it full 
administrative and supervisory powers over minority schools and other cultural 
institutions. Cultural Councils enjoy the power to raise taxes from the registered 
members of the minority group. This income supplements funding from central and 
local government previously allocated to minority schools within the state sector. 
Unlike existing local authorities, the Cultural Councils envisaged under the law are 
not territorially based.  
In territorial terms, inhabitants of localities where “at least half of the permanent 
residents belong to a national minority” have the right to receive responses from state 
agencies, local governments and their officials in the relevant minority language.47 
However, under the terms of the cultural autonomy law the designation ‘minority’ is 
deemed to apply only to “citizens of Estonia who maintain longstanding, firm and 
lasting ties with Estonia … [and] … are distinct from Estonians on the basis of their 
                                                 
47 The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia. Translation into English prepared by the Estonian 
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ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics’.48 An analysis of the debates 
surrounding this law shows that the term ‘national minority’ was most emphatically 
not taken to refer to the large population of non-Estonians without citizenship. In 
keeping with the legal continuity principle, the Estonian authorities insisted that 
settlers were immigrants – citizens of the USSR who had settled in Estonia during the 
period of occupation. Prior to the adoption of legislative amendments in 1998 (see 
below) the jus sanguinis principle of nationhood underpinning the Estonian law on 
citizenship dictated that children born to non-citizens living in Estonia had no 
automatic entitlement to Estonian citizenship. Many titular contributors to the 
minorities debate argued that even those settlers who obtained citizenship by 
naturalization could not be classed as representatives of a ‘national’ – as opposed to 
an ‘ethnic’ minority. In legal terms, Estonian minorities policy is entirely consistent 
with the CoE FCNM. In their approach to the settler issue, Estonian state-builders 
thus consciously sought to exploit the absence of any universal framework for 
minority rights, employing the very arguments that a number of EU member states 
had used in order to avoid any far-reaching minority rights obligations to their own 
immigrant populations. 
Although Western states and international organizations could not dispute the legal 
bases of Estonia’s nationalities policy, they were nevertheless deeply concerned by its 
possible social and political implications. Comparisons between immigrant minorities 
in Western Europe and Russian settlers in Estonia, of course, disregard the difference 
in historical context. Whereas in existing EU member states, immigrants constitute a 
small fraction of the population, Estonia’s Soviet-era settler population makes up one 
third. More importantly, Russians who settled in the Baltic after the war (and their 
descendants who were born there) could for the most part barely have conceived of 
the fact that Estonia was a different country from the one that they had left behind. As 
soviet citizens of Russian nationality, they not only enjoyed the same rights – 
however limited – as ‘titular’ inhabitants of the ESSR, but also access to a full system 
of education (primary–secondary–tertiary) and guaranteed employment in their native 
tongue. In short, at the time of independence they bore all the hallmarks of a national 
minority as defined by Kymlicka and Brubaker. Against this background, it is hardly 
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surprising that the state order established during 1992 – and especially the 
naturalization provisions of the law on citizenship – became the focus of near 
universal opposition amongst the non-Estonian population. Whilst primarily 
concerned with overturning existing legislation and obtaining citizenship for all 
residents, Russian organizations and parties have nevertheless tried to mobilize all 
people whose first language is Russian, regardless of ethnicity or citizenship status. 
The aim has been none other than to create a new Russian-speaking (as opposed to 
purely Russian) nationality with claims to distinct status within Estonia. According to 
Estonian scholar Raivo Vetik, the Estonian ‘modernist’ project of merging culturally 
and linguistically different social groups into a congruent whole has been countered 
by a ‘post-modernist’ discourse stressing ideals of difference, plurality, equal rights 
and multiculturalism.49  
A widespread sense of alienation on the part of the Russian-speaking population 
has thus far not proved a sufficient condition to produce a mass politics of collective 
action.50 The failure to achieve more effective and sustained political mobilization in 
opposition to the existing state order has had much to do with the continued 
heterogeneity demonstrated by a ‘Russian-speaking population’ now further sub-
divided along lines of citizenship and socio-economic status. However, in spite of the 
entirely bloodless transition to independence during 1988-91, many Western 
observers remained fearful that the radically-changed socio-political status of the 
Russian population might lead to the emergence of open unrest and perhaps even 
violent conflict. Certainly, most authors would assert that ‘ethnic democracy’ is not a 
reliable long-term prescription for ethnopolitical stability. Whilst Western states and 
international organizations have never questioned the underlying basis of Estonia’s 
citizenship policy – and, thus, by implication, the immigrant status accorded to 
Soviet-era settlers – their perspective on the issue differed significantly from the 
dominant conception held by the Estonian authorities in the early years of 
independence. It seems certain that for most representatives of ESRP and the Isamaa 
bloc, settlers and their descendants were viewed as metics who should be encouraged 
to ‘voluntarily repatriate’ as soon as possible. In keeping with this view, once the 
Russian Federation assumed the mantle of legal successor to the USSR at the start of 
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1992, settlers and their descendants were deemed to have become citizens of Russia 
for whom the Estonian state bore no legal responsibility. The authorities thus denied 
that non-citizens could be termed ‘stateless persons’. Rather, the term ‘persons of 
undetermined citizenship’ was used.  
From a Western point of view, however, settlers constituted an immigrant minority 
rather than a metic group. OSCE HCNM Max van der Stoël, for instance, insisted 
that, de facto, Estonia was responsible for its non-citizens, even if, legally, they could 
not be classed as stateless persons.51 In common with other observers, he was anxious 
that the naturalization of the settler population should proceed as quickly as possible, 
lest the citizen/non-citizen divide crystallize into an enduring division and settlers be 
consigned to the status of a permanent underclass.52 The Western position was neatly 
summarized in 1995 by a leading British diplomat, who stated that although the UK 
government of the day regarded the citizenship law as a legitimate response to a 
peculiar set of historical circumstances, it had nonetheless consistently underlined its 
desire to see the issue of citizenship resolved as quickly as possible.53 The Western 
stance on minority rights has, however, been somewhat ambiguous and open to 
differing interpretations. Broadly speaking, it could be regarded as lending support to 
a policy of liberal nationalism involving the promotion of Estonian as the sole official 
state language and basis for the common societal culture. At the same time, however, 
Western actors have favoured a “‘multicultural’ approach to integration which would 
allow and indeed encourage … [post-war Russian settlers] … to maintain various 
aspects of their ethnic heritage even as they integrate”.54 As I argue below, however, 
the factual situation which obtains in post-Soviet Estonia has meant that Western 
prescriptions for minority rights have shown a growing tendency to go beyond the 
limited ‘immigrant multiculturalism’ practised in Western societies towards a 
paradigm more consistent with the needs of an institutionally complete ‘national’ 
minority. 
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In practical terms, the distinction between national minority and ethnic minority in 
post-Soviet Estonia has been far less clear cut than one might suppose. Both the 
citizenship law and the draft constitution were submitted to scrutiny by experts from 
the Council of Europe and the CSCE during 1992, and this interaction doubtless 
helped to reinforce trends towards pragmatism. Thus, in spite of the strong emphasis 
on legal continuity, the new state order established in 1992 necessarily took at least 
some account of the realities arising from fifty years of Soviet rule. The Estonian 
constitution grants both citizens and non-citizens the same access to fundamental 
freedoms and social and economic rights.55 This includes freedom of association, 
although non-citizens are not allowed to join political parties. Non-citizen residents 
also have the right to vote in local elections. The constitution also states that in 
localities where the language of the majority of permanent residents (not citizens - 
DS) is not Estonian, local governments may use the majority language as an internal 
working language. Whilst it transpires that no local authority has actually applied 
formally for permission to implement this provision, Russian has in practice 
continued to serve as an internal working language in predominantly Russian-
speaking cities of the north-east such as Narva and Sillamäe. Moreover, whilst the law 
on non-territorial cultural autonomy is open only to non-titular residents with 
citizenship, a separate law on non-commercial unions and organizations has given 
non-citizens the possibility to form their own cultural organizations. State and local 
government have also extended fairly extensive support to such organizations 
operating outside the framework of the cultural autonomy law, ensuring that a thriving 
network of cultural societies and minority schools has continued to develop during the 
post-independence era.56 
 
IV. “Dancing on a Rope” –  Europeanization and National Self Assertion,  
1992-97 
 
In spite of these concessions, however, representatives of Western states and 
international organizations remained concerned by the political exclusion of the settler 
community. As such, international observers such as Max van der Stoël impressed 
upon the Estonian government the need to engage in dialogue with representatives of 
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the Russian-speaking population. Western fears were stoked by Russia’s vigorous 
internationalization of minority issues in Estonia and Latvia from 1992 onwards, 
which employed wildly emotive terms such as ‘apartheid’ and ‘velvet ethnic 
cleansing’. While these interventions did not succeed in their aim of reversing 
citizenship policy, they certainly placed Estonia and Latvia even more squarely under 
the international spotlight. Russia’s allegations appeared briefly to cast doubt on 
Estonia’s entry to the Council of Europe in 1992, whilst the European Parliament 
delayed ratification of trade and cooperation agreements for several months until it 
was sure that minority policies met international standards. Continued pressure from 
Russia also helped to ensure that Estonia and Latvia became early ‘test cases’ for the 
new conflict prevention approach of the OSCE.57 Russia’s strategy of 
internationalization ultimately proved counter-productive, however. By inviting a 
number of international delegations – and, most significantly, by consenting to the 
long-term presence of an the OSCE Monitoring Mission (1993-2001) – Estonia was 
able to demonstrate that allegations of mass systematic human rights abuses had no 
basis in reality.58  
In response to Western fears over the political exclusion of settlers, the Estonian 
government was at pains to portray the situation arrived at in 1992 as a temporary 
state of affairs. Legislation on citizenship, it was insisted, should be seen as a 
mechanism for setting in train a developmental process of integration rather than a 
means of insitutionalizing an ethnopolitical divide.59 Nevertheless, Western concerns 
did have some foundation, insofar as the ‘decolonization’ caucus remained influential 
within the Isamaa coalition government of 1992-95. That Isamaa’s nationalities 
policy rested on the dual tenets of ‘integration and repatriation’ points to an 
unresolved tension within the government during this time. In the course of 1992 to 
1995, the ruling coalition was aptly characterized as “dancing on a rope”, torn 
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between the demands of its own radical nationalist wing on the one hand, and the 
requirements of securing westward integration on the other.60 
In his inaugural speech to the Riigikogu in October 1992, prime minister Mart Laar 
listed membership of the Council of Europe and an association agreement with the EU 
amongst his government’s priorities.61 In keeping with this aspiration, the government 
was able to push through a series of amendments to citizenship legislation in line with 
recommendations put forward by international experts who had scrutinized the law. 
These amendments fixed the linguistic requirement for naturalization at a level 
corresponding to a basic working knowledge of the Estonian language (level C under 
the 1989 law on language) whilst also specifying that entitlement to citizenship would 
henceforth pass via the maternal as well as the paternal line.62 These demonstrations 
of good faith did much to facilitate Estonia’s entry into the Council of Europe in May 
1993, a full two years ahead of neighbouring Latvia. At the same time – the 
amendments to the citizenship law, bringing as they did the prospect of a significant 
widened non-Estonian electorate by the time of the next parliamentary elections – 
caused consternation within radical nationalist circles. The final debate on Estonia’s 
admission to the Council of Europe came at a time when Estonia was poised to adopt 
a new law on local elections. Whilst the constitutional provision allowing all 
permanent residents to vote in local elections had greatly strengthened the Estonian 
case for membership, CoE experts nevertheless felt that this concession would be 
undermined if non-citizens were not also granted the right to stand for office. In line 
with these recommendations, the Estonian government apparently gave assurances 
that this provision would be included in the law submitted to parliament.63 Allowing 
non-citizens the right to stand for office, however, was clearly a concession too far as 
far as radical nationalist MPs were concerned, not least because former communist 
elites in the Russophone north-east had emerged as a prime locus of opposition to the 
new state order during 1991-93. When the law on local elections was presented to 
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parliament, deputies from the Estonian National Independence Party broke with the 
government on the issue, thereby ensuring that this provision was deleted from the 
final law.64 
Estonia gained admittance to the European ‘club of democracies’ with its 
controversial state order more or less intact. Yet the requisite amendments to 
citizenship legislation, however cosmetic, has aroused the wrath of radical 
nationalists. Addressing the nation on the occasion of the country’s entry to the CoE, 
Estonia’s President Lennart Meri felt obliged to reassure his compatriots that 
integrating into Europe was not the same as ‘dissolving’ into Europe, and as such 
would permit Estonians to retain their distinct language and culture.65 With the crucial 
hurdle of CoE membership safely negotiated, the government clearly felt at liberty to 
answer its domestic critics by pursuing a more assertive line towards the non-citizen 
population. At the start of June 1993 it unveiled what has proved to be the most 
controversial piece of legislation of the post-Soviet period – the law on aliens. Whilst 
measures to formalize the legal status of the non-citizen population were both 
necessary and – arguably – long overdue, the ‘aliens’ legislation seemed calculated to 
cause the maximum uncertainty and anxiety amongst the representatives of this group. 
Under the law, all civilians residing in Estonia on Soviet or Russian passports were 
given a year in which to apply for new residence and work permits. Failure to do so 
would confer a formal status of illegal immigrant and the prospect of deportation. No 
distinction was drawn between immigrants who had arrived in Estonia the previous 
day and former Soviet citizens who had been born in the country or lived there for 
more than twenty years. The psychologically unsettling effect of the law was 
heightened by the fact that only temporary, five year permits were to be issued in the 
first instance. In order to qualify, applicants were required to possess a ‘lawful source 
of income’, a category only vaguely defined under the law. There seems little doubt 
that the law on aliens was conceived as a means of intensifying the pressure upon 
non-citizens to ‘repatriate’ themselves to Russia or other CIS countries. The same 
could be said of the new law on education passed during the same month. This 
obliged all Russian-language gymnasiums (upper secondary schools for pupils aged 
between 16 and 19) and higher education establishments to switch to teaching entirely 
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in Estonian by the year 2000. Whilst local authorities were given the right to 
determine the language of instruction in basic secondary schools (grades 1-9), 
Russian-speaking pupils wishing to obtain access to state-funded education beyond 
the age of sixteen would be required to attain the requisite level of Estonian-language 
skills. The prospect of an end to the parity between Estonian and Russian-language 
education was in itself unsettling from the point of view of the Russian-speaking 
population. The dearth of qualified Estonian language teachers, moreover, meant that 
the deadline of 2000 appeared wildly unrealistic. The law thus appears to constitute a 
further example of an overly legalistic approach designed to increase pressure upon 
the non-citizen population. 
These new laws aroused particular consternation in the predominantly Russophone 
north-east. Not least, the provision on ‘legal income’ and other ambiguities inherent in 
the aliens act were alarming to the large body of unemployed non-citizens residing 
there. For rebellious town council leaders in Narva and Sillamäe – who, as non-
citizens were now barred from standing in the local elections scheduled for October 
1993 – the law on aliens served as a suitable pretext for organizing a local referendum 
on whether the two towns should be given ‘national-territorial autonomy within the 
Republic of Estonia’. In taking this step, the local elites were clearly seeking to 
capitalize upon the international controversy elicited by the aliens law, which had 
attracted criticism from, inter alia, the OSCE. Thanks partly to intervention by Max 
van der Stoël, a number of amendments were introduced to the law on aliens. These 
removed many of the ambiguities of the original draft, without really altering its 
substance. Meanwhile, the tense stand-off between central government and local 
authorities in Narva and Sillamäe during the summer/autumn of 1993 was ultimately 
resolved peacefully, with the former communist leadership relinquishing power at the 
October elections. These gave rise to councils which were more concerned with 
economic development than political autonomy and, as such, far more amenable to 
cooperation with central government.66 In spite of some claims to the contrary, 
however, the so-called ‘Aliens Crisis’ of 1993 did not mark a fundamental turning 
point in Estonia’s policies towards its Russian-speaking population. In this regard, the 
international mediation of that year has been rightly described as ‘fire-fighting’, 
                                                 
66 D. J. Smith “Narva Region”, loc cit; G. Smith et al, Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: 
114. 
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which alleviated but did not resolve the tension between state and minority.67 
Intervention by the OSCE was important in terms of initiating a dialogue between the 
government and the main ‘Russian-speaking’ political organizations, not least through 
the creation of a Round Table of Nationalities under presidential auspices. The 
government, however, continued to exhibit a legalistic approach to the citizenship 
issue. The widespread dissatisfaction apparent amongst the non-citizen population 
was further heightened by the introduction of new, amended citizenship law in 
January 1995. Ostensibly designed to bring Estonia more closely into line with 
‘European standards’ pertaining to naturalization, the new law increased the residence 
requirement for citizenship to five years, whilst introducing further tests which 
required applicants to demonstrate a detailed knowledge of the Estonian constitution 
and political system.68  
Nor did the accession of a new, ostensibly ‘left-of-centre’ government after the 
February 1995 elections mark any major change to the underlying basis of the system. 
In line with international recommendations, non-citizens were given firmer guarantees 
of their continued right to reside in and travel to and from Estonia, most notably 
through the widespread issuing of so-called ‘Alien’s Passports’ from 1996 onwards. 
At the same time, the period 1995 to 1997 also witnessed further ‘nationalizing’ 
measures intended to further undermine the position of the Russian-speaking minority 
within society.69 Minority organizations, however, also began to display a much 
greater degree of organization and assertiveness during this period. One important 
factor in this regard was the election of six Russian-speaking deputies to the Riigikogu 
in the elections of 1995 (and again in 1999). Also, in spite of the increased ‘loyalty’ 
shown by local councils in the north-east after 1993, local elites there have continued 
to engage in ‘rights-based politics’. In 1996, for instance, new proposals that 
candidates standing for office in national and local elections should be required to 
demonstrate a working knowledge of the Estonian language elicited significant 
opposition in Narva as well as concern on the part of international experts at the 
OSCE. These expressions of disquiet led president Lennart Meri to veto the law. 
 
                                                 
67 D. J. Smith, Estonia. Independence and European Integration , op cit.: 89 
68 K. Malmberg & R. Sikk, ‘Muulased tahavad lastele Eesti kodakondsust’, Eesti Päevaleht, 4 April 
1997; Tartu University Market Research Team, The Attitude of Town Residents of North-Eastern 
Estonia towards Estonian Reforms and Social Policy: a Comparative Study of 1993, 1994 and 1995 
(Tartu: University of Tartu, 1995): 8. 
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V. 1997-2002: Towards Multicultural Democracy? 
 
If the two years after 1995 suggested a significant growth in ethnopolitical stability 
compared to the period 1992 to 1995, it was only in 1997-98 that Estonia took 
significant steps to revise its nationalities policy.70 As already noted, the 1997 
evaluation of Estonia’s readiness by the European Commission indicated that the 
country fulfilled the rather vague ‘Copenhagen criteria’ relating to respect for and 
protection of minorities. Nevertheless, the Commission avis highlighted the need to 
speed up the integration of the non-citizen population. As one of the stipulations for 
entry to full membership negotiations, Estonia was required to enact a series of 
amendments to its citizenship legislation which grant automatic citizenship to all 
children born to non-citizen parents in Estonia after February 1992. This demand 
reflected recommendations by experts at the OSCE, who had expressed increasing 
concern at possible stagnation in the process of naturalizing the non-citizen 
population. With over a thousand children being born annually to non-citizen parents 
in Estonia and Latvia, there were fears that this would serve to perpetuate the 
citizen/non-citizen divide. Experts also noted that this amendment would bring 
Estonia in line with other OSCE members and with UN provisions relating to the 
rights of the child.71 Although the proposed amendments elicited a fierce political 
debate lasting for the best part of a year, their adoption in December 1998 can be seen 
as indicative of a growing political consensus amongst titular actors that the 
integration of non-citizens is a necessary course of action. According to Vello Pettai, 
one of the most important reasons for this was the fact that Estonia’s prospects for a 
rapid accession to the EU improved significantly during the period in question. “More 
than any other single mechanism of influence”, he notes, “the EU made most Estonian 
and Latvian politicians realise that improving the citizenship issue was crucially 
important”.72 
                                                                                                                                            
69 D. J. Smith “Legal Continuity”, Chapter 8. 
70 In this respect, it was notable that the Council of Europe decided to end its monitoring of Estonia in 
January 1997. For a summary of developments during this period, see D. J. Smith, “Russia, Estonia and 
the Search for a Stable Ethno-Politics”, Journal of Baltic Studies, 29 (1) 1998: 3-18. 
71 Pettai, “Estonia and Latvia: International Influences on Citizenship and Minority Integration’, op cit: 
275-276. 
72 Ibid. By the same token, one could add that NATO membership for the three Baltic states appeared 
to have slipped down the Western agenda following the Madrid Summit of 1997. This increased the 
importance of the EU as a source of security against the perceived threat of Russia 
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A further significant step in this direction was the revival, in May 1997, of a 
ministerial post devoted entirely to ethnic affairs. This can be seen as symptomatic of 
a determination by new prime minister Mart Siimann to demonstrate responsiveness 
to EU concerns ahead of the impending verdict on Estonia’s membership 
negotiations.73 The new post of Minister for Population and Ethnic Affairs passed to 
Progressive Party leader Andra Veidemann, who devoted herself wholeheartedly to 
the role. Veidemann promptly established a commission charged with producing a 
draft integration policy concept by the end of the year. Following approval by 
government and parliament during the first half of 1998, the draft was circulated 
amongst representatives of parliament, government bodies and local authorities. A 
final approved text emerged in March 2000 as the State Programme “Integration in 
Estonian Society 2000-2007”.74 The drafting of the State Programme marked the first 
attempt to devise a coherent strategy for the integration of non-citizens. In this regard, 
it is notable that the programme describes Soviet era settlers and their descendants 
quite unequivocally as representatives of an ‘ethnic minority’ rather than ‘foreigners’ 
or ‘aliens’, as had previously been the case in many official documents.75 The 
programme defines three main spheres for the integration of the Russian-speaking 
minority: linguistic-communicative, legal-political and socio-economic. The principal 
focus of the strategy is on the linguistic dimension, which received three quarters of 
the funding allocated to the programme during 2000-2002. However, another of the 
stated goals of the programme is to give ethnic minorities the opportunity to preserve 
their ethnic and cultural distinctiveness. The programme can thus be seen as marking 
the emergence of ‘immigrant multiculturalism’ into the official discourse on statehood 
and minorities. Whereas previously, ‘integration’ of the non-citizen population – 
insofar as this was accepted as a valid course of action at all – was deemed to connote 
a one-way process of assimilation into Estonian culture. The state integration strategy 
published in March 2000 makes it clear that this understanding has changed, and that 
the scope of the term has been widened to denote the integration of society as a 
                                                 
73 Smith, Estonia. Independence and European Integration , op cit: 101 
74 For full text, see: http://www.riik.ee/saks/ikomisjon/programme.htm. For a recent assessment of the 
programme, see Open Society Institute, Minority Protection in Estonia. An Assessment of the 
Programme Integration in Estonian Society 2000 -2007 (Open Society Institute, 2002). 
75 The document lumps together the conceptually distinct categories of ‘ethnic’ minority and ‘national’ 
minority under a single generic heading (‘ethnic minority’). 
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whole.76 The integration programme identifies ‘common core’ characteristics as 
democratic values, a shared information sphere and Estonian language environment 
and common government institutions, and calls upon both Estonians and non-
Estonians to take part in the ‘bilateral process’ of integration.77  
This ‘reciprocal vision’ of integration was not present in the original draft, but 
emerged out the process of consultation with various interested parties during 1998 to 
2000. The provisions relating to preservation of ethnic differences, for instance, were 
only added at the behest of the Presidential Roundtable of Nationalities.78 Whilst EU 
experts were only indirectly involved in the process of elaboration, the final 
programme was clearly consistent with EU thinking on the nationalities question. In 
its progress report for 2002, for instance, the Commission notes that “the Estonian 
authorities should ensure that emphasis is placed on a multicultural model of 
integration as stated in the aims of the integration programme”.79 Whether the strategy 
constitutes a viable blueprint for a definitive resolution of the nationality question, 
however, remains to be seen. As a recent assessment of the programme makes clear, 
however, there remains “a clear divide between minority and majority perceptions of 
the goals and priorities of the integration process … which must [still] be addressed in 
order to achieve mutually satisfactory results”.80 Whilst representatives of the 
Russian-speaking population have welcomed the programme and hailed it as a major 
step towards achieving greater understanding between majority and minority, they 
have nevertheless criticized the programme for its emphasis upon the linguistic-
communicative as opposed to the legal-political aspects of integration, and have 
highlighted the need to pay more attention to issues of discrimination and 
citizenship.81 The continued emphasis on the latter question in particular indicates that 
there is still some way to go before Russian-speaking representatives will accept the 
status of an ‘immigrant minority’. Under the terms of the existing law on citizenship, 
linguistic-communicative integration can be seen as entirely consistent with legal-
political integration, since the acquisition of a working knowledge of Estonian is one 
                                                 
76 State Programme “Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007”: 3; interview between the present 
author and Stephan Heidenhain, First Secretary of the OSCE Mission to Estonia. Narva: 22 November 
2000. 
77 Open Society Institute, op cit.: 200. 
78 Ibid.: 196 and 227. 
79 European Commission, Progress Report Estonia, op cit.: 32. 
80 Open Society Institute, op cit.: 192 
81 Ibid.: 197-198 
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of the criteria for naturalization as a citizen. Russian-speaking parties and 
organizations, however, continue to reject the current naturalization paradigm in 
favour of a discourse of ‘equal rights’, arguing that citizenship should be made 
available to all residents. The argument can be summed up in the following 
intervention by Russian-speaking parliamentary deputy Sergei Ivanov, who in 1997 
noted that “our linguistic democracy is not yet a representative and participatory 
democracy”.82 In public, at least, the vast majority of Russian-speaking political 
actors does not question the contention that non-Estonians should become conversant 
with the majority language. Nevertheless, in the course of the discussions surrounding 
the State Integration Programme, minority representatives questioned the contention 
that “within a multicultural Estonia, the Estonian language and culture should have a 
privileged status”.83 Such interventions signal that Russian leaders remain wedded to 
a multi-nation as opposed to a polyethnic variant of statehood. In the course of the 
discussions, proposals to curtail upper secondary and tertiary education in the Russian 
language emerged as a particular source of disquiet. Indeed, upon reading the initial 
draft of the state programme, two Russian-speaking members of the expert 
commission resigned, accusing the authors of striving for ‘assimilation’.84 The 
schools question has also been a particular bone of contention in north-east Estonia, 
where there remains considerable support for territorial autonomy85  
The concerns of Russian-speaking actors have been addressed at least partly by a 
series of recent amendments to the law on education. Whereas the original law of 
1993 had provided for a complete transition to Estonian-language instruction in upper 
secondary schools by 2000, the deadline was subsequently extended to 2007. Under a 
further amendment, it was then stipulated that 60 per cent of gymnasiums should 
make the switch by the specified date.86 Finally, in March 2002, parliament passed a 
further amendment, according to which full-time Russian-language education can 
continue beyond 2007 in municipally-owned gymnasiums where the population so 
wishes. In its 2002 Report on Estonia, the EU Commission notes that “this 
                                                 
82 VIII Riigikogu Stenogramm, VI Istungjärk, 19 November 1997.  
http://www.riigikogu.es/ems/index.html. 
83 Open Society Institute, op cit.: 198 
84 Ibid.: 197; in this regard, criticism was also voiced by the Centre Party, which has in recent years 
again begun to challenge the hitherto dominant conception of nation-statehood. See also D.J. Smith, 
“Narva Region”, loc cit. 
85 D. J. Smith, loc cit. 
86 European Commission, Progress Report Estonia (Brussels: European Commission, 2000): 19. 
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development is to be welcomed and strengthens the rights of the Russian-speaking 
minority. However, in order to have equal access to the Estonian labour market, it is 
essential for Russian-speakers to have a good command of the Estonian language. It is 
therefore important to ensure that Estonia has a sufficient number of qualified 
bilingual teachers in schools”.87 As the above statement makes clear, EU support for 
continued upper secondary education in the Russian language should not be 
interpreted as calling into question the currently existing unitary model of statehood 
based upon a single official language. Recent changes to the law could indeed be 
viewed as merely taking due account of the social realities bequeathed by half a 
century of soviet rule; not least, they represent a belated recognition that the goal of a 
complete transfer by 2000 (or even 2007) was wildly unrealistic given the continued 
shortage of personnel qualified to teach in the state language. Nevertheless, one could 
argue that the decision to continue state-funded upper-secondary education in the 
Russian-language takes Estonia beyond immigrant multiculturalism/polyethnic 
statehood as conventionally understood in Western Europe. Advocates of a unitary, 
mono-lingual state order, at least, will doubtless regard the continued existence of 
Russian-language gymnasiums as a development which could strengthen demands for 
formally recognized territorial autonomy for the north-east and, perhaps ultimately, a 
bilingual form of statehood. 
A similar point could be made regarding recent modifications to the laws on 
elections and language, as well as suggestions that Estonia should amend its 
legislation on state service and political parties in order to allow non-citizens greater 
participation in the political life of the country.88 In late 1997, the then Estonian 
government – perhaps seeking to counterbalance the impending liberalization of the 
citizenship law – again attempted to introduce a provision that all candidates standing 
for election to local and national government must demonstrate proficiency in the 
Estonian language. At the same time, the Riigikogu also instructed the government to 
formulate new Estonian-language requirements for entrepreneurs and employees 
working in the private sector. The former proposal was eventually scrapped, and the 
latter substantially diluted, after both had elicited criticism from local Russian-
speaking political actors as well as from representatives of the OSCE, the Council of 
                                                 
87 European Commission, Progress Report Estonia (2002), op cit.: 33 
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Europe and the EU. Among other things, the often heated parliamentary debates on 
these provisions again exposed the ambiguous nature of international minority rights 
provision, with each side able to invoke differing conceptions of European norms in 
order to support its argument. Thus, Russian deputies challenged the presenters of the 
bill to cite a single European Union state in which candidates for parliamentary and 
local elections need to sit a language exam and entrepreneurs and personnel working 
in the service sector are required to demonstrate competence in the state language.89 
The former stipulation in particular, it was argued, contravened not only the Estonian 
constitution, but also the European Charter on Local Government and the European 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.90 In response to 
these claims, the head of the Estonian State Language Inspectorate Ilmar Tomusk 
cited a Council of Europe recommendation that individuals residing in a state where 
they have not always lived – in practice first and second generation immigrants – 
should develop a sufficient degree of competence in the language of that state to 
enable them to participate actively in professional, political and social life.91 In this 
respect, it was asserted, Estonia had tried to follow the example of other CoE member 
states. Although European practice in this area varies greatly from state to state, ‘in 
principle’ the language examination system does exist in European states. “Each state 
defends its own language”, maintained Tomusk, before going on to cite practices in 
Finland, Sweden, Germany, Austria and Greece.92 If one looks at the systems of 
‘immigrant multiculturalism’ that have emerged in the West, those groups acquiring 
minority rights have typically been well integrated into the dominant societal culture. 
In Estonia this is not the case – indeed, it is perhaps too early to speak of a single, 
dominant societal culture within the state. Whilst the EU and other European 
international organizations continue to voice support for the integration of the Soviet-
era settler community and – beyond this – the emergence of a system of immigrant 
multiculturalism, recent interventions could be construed as prioritizing minority 
                                                                                                                                            
88 The latter suggestion was made in November 2000 by outgoing Council of Baltic Sea States 
Commissioner on Human Rights Ole Espersen. In Espersen’s view, such a move would conform to the 
corresponding convention of the Council of Europe. Cited in Narvskaia Gazeta, 10 November 2000. 
89 VIII Riigikogu Stenogramm, VI Istungjärk, 19 November 1997; 
 http://www.riigikogu.ee/ems/stenograms/1998/11/t98112309-05.html. 
90 VIII Riigikogu Stenogramm, VI Istungjärk, loc cit. 
91 http://www.riigikogu.ee/ems/stenograms/1998/11/t98112309-05.html. What actually constitutes a 
“sufficient degree of competence” is left to the discretion of member states themselves. 
92 Ibid. 
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rights over integration. This in turn might fuel demands for a more fundamental 
revision of the existing state order. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
As Will Kymlicka has remarked, the current situation in Estonia defies easy 
categorization and does not lend itself easily to the importation of Western models. 
From the point of view of international actors seeking to guide these countries’ post-
communist transition, the main challenge at the start of the 1990s was to find the 
middle ground between the ‘nationalizing’ impulses of the titular elite and the one 
hand and the claims for national self-determination voiced by local Russian-speakers 
– and backed by Russia – on the other.93 The optimal solution was deemed to lie in a 
variant of ‘immigrant multiculturalism’ which would restore the position of Estonian 
language as the basis of the dominant societal culture, whilst offering the Russian-
speaking population, newly reconfigured as a minority, some measure of language 
rights as well as the opportunity to practice its own culture. While the underlying 
tension – so visible in the early-mid 1990s – between ‘nationalizing state’ tendencies 
and ‘Europeanization’ has plainly not disappeared, the dominant discourse amongst 
titular actors has plainly shifted towards the EU-sponsored multiculturalist paradigm 
since 1997, as a number of studies have argued, and the current State Integration 
Programme perhaps most clearly demonstrates. This shift has even been apparent 
within the former ‘decolonization’ caucus of the nationalist right. Although the 
Fatherland League (Isamaa), back in office at the head of three-party right-of-centre 
coalition from March 1999-early 2002, expressed dissatisfaction with the 
multicultural approach of the integration programme – “according to the Constitution, 
Estonia is not a multicultural state but a nation-state, and legislators have never 
                                                 
93 As Graham Smith reminds us (“Transnational Politics”, op cit.: 516), Western anxieties regarding 
Russian demands for national self-determination mainly related to the perceived danger that a 
secessionist movement might arise in the north-east. Writing in 1999, he noted that explicit calls for 
greater regional autonomy had “not appeared on the OSCE or HCNM agenda. No doubt this is because 
it is seen as compromising the territorial integrity and stability of Estonia. In other words, the 
assumption here is that the promotion of minority rights in the north-east would institutionalise a 
politics of difference, which could eventually fuel irredentist claims”. Whilst the 1993 Narva 
referendum was widely perceived as a secessionist move, available evidence suggests that this was not 
in fact the case, and that local elites were simply seeking to re-draw the existing state order to their own 
advantage. See D. J. Smith, “Narva Region”, loc cit. Moreover, as I argue here, the position of 
international organizations re: the north-east appears to be shifting. 
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decided to accept multicultural ideology as a development model for Estonia” – the 
government (again headed by Mart Laar) nonetheless adopted the programme in 
March 2000. More recently, the Fatherland Union, by now returned to opposition, 
declared that it embraced all naturalized citizens who demonstrated loyalty to the 
Estonian state.94  
The last few years have also witnessed encouraging progress on the ‘Russian-
speaking’ side of the ethnopolitical divide. As often as not, it seems, the ‘rights-based 
politics’ of the Russian-speaking elite have been based on demands for greater 
resources to facilitate the integration of non-citizens into the polity.95 This suggests 
that the two communities might indeed be starting to coalesce around the EU 
paradigm. However, as Kymlicka has rightly observed, many local Russians still find 
it hard to adapt to the idea that they are an ‘immigrant minority’. Although the 
‘Russian-speaking population’ is still far from being a coherent identity group, its 
leaders have identified their constituency framed their demands in avowedly national 
as opposed to ethnic terms. In light of this fact, Kymlicka has suggested that it might 
ultimately be necessary to augment the current system of immigrant multiculturalism 
with a form of rights more appropriate to the needs of a national minority – i.e. a 
model which “involves a certain degree of institutional separateness, self-
administration and extensive mother tongue language rights”.96 In this regard, 
Kymlicka suggests that a system of non-territorial cultural autonomy might be the 
ideal paradigm for the needs of the Estonian Russians and the other communities of 
the Russian ‘diaspora’. Whilst the current author can only concur with Kymlicka’s 
recommendation of this paradigm, his suggestions overlook the fact that Estonia 
already has a law on non-territorial cultural autonomy and that this law has already 
been rejected out of hand by Russian-speaking leaders. Some of the more practical 
objections raised against cultural autonomy – e.g. a lack of funding possibilities 
                                                 
94 Quotation from a letter by Tiit Sinisaar, Chairman of the Fatherland League Parliamentary faction 
expressing the party’s position on the State Programme. Cited in Open Society Institute, op cit.: 198; 
Also notable in this regard is the fact that when in August 2000 a state adviser called for more funds to 
aid the ‘repatriation’ of non-citizens holding Russian passports, he was immediately disowned by the 
Isamaa-led government, which insisted that its policy was predicated on the integration of all non-
citizens. See discussion in Postimees, 23 and 24 August 2000. 
95 See, for instance: G. Smith and A. Wilson, “Rethinking Russia’s Post-Soviet Diaspora: the Potential 
for Political Mobilisation in Eastern Ukraine and North-East Estonia”, Europe-Asia Studies, 49 (5) 
1997: 852; Smith et al, Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands, op cit.: 114; D. J. Smith, 
“Cultural Autonomy in Estonia: a Relevant Paradigm for the Post-Soviet Era?”, One Europe or 
Several? Working Paper 1901. (Brighton: Economic and Social Research Council, 2001): 23 -24. 
96 Kymlicka, “Estonia’s Integration Policies”, op cit.: 17 
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within minority communities; the fact that, in its current wording, the law does not 
entitle most Russians the status of ‘minority’ – might yet be addressed by an ongoing 
review of the legislation.97 There are more fundamental sticking points, however: a 
number of Russian commentators, for instance, have objected to the ‘dual taxation’ 
inherent in the cultural autonomy scheme. In keeping with the discourse of equal 
rights, they feel that as taxpayers, they should have automatic access to state-funded 
education in the Russian language. A second objection relates to the fact that cultural 
autonomy is not built on the territorial principle and thus – one supposes – is not 
viewed as relevant to the needs of the territorially compact Russian-speaking 
population of the north-east.98 As already mentioned, the EU and other international 
actors appear to be moving towards support for enhanced territorial autonomy in 
north-east Estonia. This is in spite of their apparent reluctance during the initial stages 
to sanction any policy based on institutional separateness. As Graham Smith noted in 
1999, “it may well be that in supporting democratisation, European organisations need 
also to recognise that such measures may necessitate multicultural guarantees in 
addition to extensive civil liberties and human rights”.99 However, as the recent high 
levels of ‘Euroscepticism’ amongst the titular nationality perhaps testifies, the EU 
must continue to strike a fine balance between minority interests and those of a titular 
nation still labouring under the burden of past injustices. Only in this way will the 
recent encouraging progress towards multicultural democracy be maintained.  
 
                                                 
97 See, for instance, D. J. Smith, “Cultural Autonomy”, loc cit; and D. J. Smith, Kurchinskii and more 
recent working paper; “Retracing Estonia’s Russians: Mikhail Kurchinskii and Interwar Cultural 
Autonomy”, Nationalities Papers, 27 (3) 1999: 455-474. The current law on cultural autonomy has 
been in force since 1993, but none of the eligible minority groups have implemented it thus far. On the 
current review of the law, see Open Society Institute, op cit.: 228-229. 
98 VII Riigikogu Stenogramm, III Istungjärk, 30 September 1993: 221. 
99 G. Smith, loc cit.  
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